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Abstract 
 
There is increased interest in the UK in cohousing as a desirable alternative for older people.  The economics 
of developing cohousing differ from the normal model for residential development; in particular the 
participatory nature of the process increases the time required and there are higher risks for both 
resident/purchaser and developer.  We examine the nature of supply and risk using the case of a new senior 
cohousing community in south London.  Given its evident benefits, senior cohousing may eventually become 
more widespread, and perceived risks will fall.  However the nature of the residential development process 
means that cohousing will always be at a disadvantage when competing for land in high-demand areas like 
London, and the time required for participatory processes increases costs.  To increase the currently small 
number of cohousing communities in the UK and ensure affordability, targeted measures may be necessary to 
enable groups to access land and mitigate the higher costs associated with longer-term collaborative processes.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years UK policy-makers have become increasingly interested in the benefits of cohousing, 
seen to be a socially and environmentally friendly residential model.  For older people in particular 
it can provide supportive communities for those who would otherwise be living alone, or far from 
support networks.  But despite its acknowledged benefits, very few such communities have been 
created in the UK—the market does not seem to provide.  Why not?  This paper examines the 
supply of cohousing in relation to the economic barriers to its provision. We investigate the role of 
the developer and the relationship between the developer and the residents as well as the factors 
which affect the cost of new cohousing and the risks and uncertainties specific to the tenure.   We 
discuss the importance of price as a determinant of individuals’ access to cohousing, and show the 
difficulty of establishing price at an early development stage—something that can seriously affect 
individuals’ possibility of remaining in the group despite commitment to it. The empirical material 
in this paper is drawn from a case study of a mixed-tenure senior cohousing development in a south 
London neighbourhood. 
 
What is cohousing and why does it appeal to policy makers? 
 
According to the UK Cohousing Network website (2012), 
‘Cohousing communities are intentional communities. They are created and run by their 
residents. Each household has a self-contained, personal and private home but residents 
come together to manage their community, share activities, eat together. Cohousing is a way 
of combating the alienation and isolation many experience today, recreating the neighbourly 
support of a village or city quarter in the past.’ 
 
Cohousing first emerged in Scandinavia in the late 1960s and 1970s as the Danish bofælleskab and 
the Swedish kollektivhus (Vestbro 1992).   There are now hundreds of cohousing communities in 
Denmark, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands and it is increasingly popular in the USA, 
especially for older people.  Cohousing communities have several characteristics that distinguish 
them from standard residential developments on the one hand and from communes on the other.  
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Each household has its own self-contained dwelling, and the community shares common facilities.  
There is normally a shared kitchen and dining area, and depending on the interests and resources of 
the group there can be a range of other facilities (artists’ studios, workshops, etc.)  Residents (at 
least the first tranche) are active participants in designing—and often in building—their homes, and 
the communities are planned so as to foster interaction between members.  Those who live in 
cohousing accept and embrace the idea of living in a neighbourly way (Sargisson 2000).  They 
manage their communities themselves, often taking decisions on a consensus basis.  Incomes are 
not pooled, as in a commune, but each household is self-supporting and neighbours engage in joint 
cost-reducing measures like car-pooling, self-management of maintenance or shared 
facilities/services like laundry. Finally, many cohousing groups espouse strong ecological 
principles; the LILAC community in Leeds, for example, has designed its built form and processes 
so as to minimise carbon emissions (Chatterton 2013). 
 
Some advocate cohousing as offering an affordable alternative to standard housing (Widener 2010), 
and many cohousing groups explicitly aim to provide affordable housing and/or cater for a range of 
income groups (Chatterton 2013). Cohousing communities may cater for all ages or be targeted at 
one demographic group.  In the UK there is a growing interest in senior (50+) cohousing from 
active members of the baby-boom generation, who seek an alternative to living alone but reject 
conventional forms of housing for older people as paternalistic and institutional.  Traditionally in 
the UK most dedicated housing for older people was provided by local authorities or charities. 
Private-sector developments for older people (usually known as retirement or ‘sheltered’ housing) 
emerged in the 1970s and 80s (Williams 1990), later than in for example the USA.  Purchase is 
limited to those meeting age requirements (normally a minimum age of 55 or 60 for all members of 
the household).  Several specialist developers serve this market; McCarthy & Stone is the largest, 
with a 60% market share (Ball 2011). 
 
In the UK there is increasing policy interest in cohousing for older people, as reflected in the 
recommendations made in the 2009 report of the government-sponsored HAPPI panel (‘Housing 
our Ageing Population: Panel for Innovation’).  This report suggested that living in a supportive 
community environment might reduce or delay the need for residential care (and the consequent 
cost to the public purse) (DCLG et al 2009).  The self-help and reciprocal-aid model of senior 
cohousing fosters mutuality and helps participants avoid the social, health and financial costs of 
isolation in old age.  It addresses the growing demand from older people for autonomy and positive 
housing choices in later life.  
 
The autonomous structure of cohousing groups resonates with the current government policy of 
localism, or decentralisation of state power, which encourages individuals, communities and 
councils to take more control over local democracy and governance.    The current pressure on the 
housing market, especially in London and southern England, has given rise to concern about ‘over-
occupation’ of large family homes (many occupied by older couples or single people whose 
children have left home), while other households are forced into overcrowded and unsuitable 
accommodation (Demos 2013). Senior cohousing—along with other, more conventional retirement 
housing--is seen as potentially offering older downsizers a compelling alternative to remaining in 
their existing homes (Wood 2013).  There are many authors, however, who question whether 
encouraging older people to move would actually free up significant amounts of housing.  More 
fundamentally, they ask whether encouraging them to move to much smaller units is sustainable or 
positive, given that a third of older people who move choose dwellings with at least three bedrooms, 
and among owner-occupiers this is 50% (Pannell et al 2012). 
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Despite the evident benefits of cohousing for both residents and the wider society, there are only 
about twelve existing communities in the UK.
2
  It seems that market mechanisms are not operating 
to produce cohousing at a more mainstream level.  This paper is an attempt to understand why this 
is so. Our research question is: how does new supply of cohousing differ from traditional models of 
housing provision, and what risks does it entail?   
 
A growing UK literature on cohousing is addressing issues such as economies of scale and sharing 
(of transport, food and energy, for instance); costs of development in different cohousing models 
and legal arrangements; maintenance and group expenditures; the conditions of leases and re-sales, 
particularly of affordable units; funding mechanisms and municipal subsidies (see for example the 
Built Environment ‘Special Issue on Cohousing’ 2012), but these themes are dealt with as part of 
wider descriptions of the housing sites, their historical trajectories, or discussions of perceived 
success. Our interest is on a comparatively under-researched area: the economic decisions of 
cohousing actors, and how financial arrangements are created and contested during the initial 
development stages of a cohousing community.  
 
This article is based on nearly three years of participant observation of the development of a new 
cohousing group for over-50s in south London, as well as desk research, and interviews with 
members of other UK cohousing groups.  During this time, the authors have attended monthly 
group meetings where they act as official minute-takers and have carried out a programme of semi-
structured interviews with individual group members and other actors including housing association 
officials and architects.  
 
The economics of cohousing development 
 
There is relatively little written about the economics of creating cohousing.  What literature there is 
generally situates cohousing in a communitarian paradigm.  This rejects traditional neo-liberal 
assumptions about individual agency, the advantages of competitive markets and the goal of 
economic growth, stressing instead the formation of strong communities as an economic and social 
objective.  Cohousing thus is seen to exemplify co-operative rather than competitive interaction, 
and to be compatible with the purposeful shrinking of the overall economy (Lietaert 2010).  One 
writer, talking about the LILAC community in Leeds, says it must ‘challenge an unsustainable 
housing model and develop an alternative based on economic equality among residents, permanent 
affordability, demarketization, nonspeculation and mutual coownership’ (Chatterton 2013, 1662).   
 
These analyses address behaviours and attitudes within cohousing communities or groups and 
generally look at the post-occupancy stage.  Our focus, by contrast, is on the mechanisms of the 
senior cohousing development process before any construction takes place—and by development 
we mean the sequence of events and combination of key actors that lead to the production of 
physical dwellings, starting with land search and acquisition through design and securing of 
planning permission and ultimately construction (not dealt with in this paper).  We are not 
concerned in this article with the group’s development in a social sense3, but rather with the 
economic dynamics, elements and stakeholders within the initial formation period of this senior 
cohousing project. The language of traditional market-oriented housing we employ here is not 
intended as a prescriptive or reflective account of cohousing’s social ethos but as a suitable 
expression of the dominant economic context and parameters within which the housing market, 
including cohousing, currently operates in London. It also reflects the language and paradigms 
employed by our own case study group.  
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The nature of the developer and the development process  
 
The construction or renovation of new cohousing dwellings requires the involvement of a developer 
to acquire land, finance construction and engage builders.  Developers can help with project 
finances and time projections and the partnerships between developers and groups, if properly 
cultivated, ‘are especially valuable for core groups who wish to create their community in urban 
areas where few developable sites remain, and where land as well as pre-development costs are 
exorbitant’ (Durrett 2009, p.90).  The developer function may be performed by the group itself or 
by an outside organisation or firm. The literature identifies three possible models (Durrett 2009).  In 
the first, a separate developer works with the group and builds dwellings to their specification.  The 
developer funds land acquisition and construction and on completion sells the units to group 
members.  In the second, cohousing members themselves finance land-acquisition and construction 
costs out of their own pockets and/or with a mortgage.  This model is found in Denmark, where 
cohousing has deep roots, and was followed at Springhill, the UK’s first new-build cohousing 
scheme. It gives group members total control over the development process, design, costs and 
timing—but they also bear all the risk, and must make a substantial financial commitment well in 
advance of moving into the new dwellings.  In the third model, common in the USA (see Glass 
2012), a developer creates a project without the input of any future residents or group members, 
then sells the units to anyone who wants to buy them.  The residents then manage the development 
and decide how to use the common facilities. This frees residents from development risk, although 
the elimination of the participatory design phase means that the group cannot shape the physical 
space or benefit from the community-building opportunity this provides.  
 
Housing associations, which are non-profit suppliers of (often social) housing, commonly 
participate in cohousing development and management in Denmark and the Netherlands, where an 
institutional top-down support system is firmly in place to encourage the senior cohousing model 
(Brenton 1998; Williams 2005, Smits 2012).  Housing associations are in many ways ideal 
development partners: they are experienced builders and their financial strength can enable the 
purchase and development of land that would otherwise be inaccessible to co-housers; they are 
social-housing providers who can facilitate the inclusion of the social rental and shared ownership 
housing that local authorities require
4
; and their non-profit status means the end price to cohousing 
group members may be lower than a for-profit developer would require.  At the same time, their 
traditional and hierarchical modus operandi presents a challenge to the vision of shared decision-
making and management that is fundamental to the cohousing model.  And, the fact that housing 
associations are non-profit does not mean that they are not commercially minded.  In the last 30 
years the sector has become increasingly professionalised and run along commercial lines; several 
of the larger UK associations have for-profit development subsidiaries that build market housing for 
rent or sale, using the proceeds to cross-subsidise their social housing (Mullins and Pawson 2010). 
This may condition their views as developers about whether cohousing itself should be ‘affordable’. 
 
Cost of development 
 
In general, the financial cost of producing a residential development comprises the cost of land, 
refurbishment of buildings and/or demolition of existing structures (if required) and construction of 
new ones; also included are fees for architects and other professionals and holding costs (Isaac et al 
2010).  From the point of view of the developer (if not necessarily of the resident), the relevant 
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comparator for senior cohousing is traditional retirement housing.  The cost calculations for 
retirement housing are much the same as for any speculative development; as Ball points out,  
 
The price of this type of housing is influenced by the same cost factors as all other types of 
new homes: that is, by land prices and costs associated with construction, development 
finance, and conforming to planning and other types of regulation (2011, 38). 
 
Some features of retirement housing do affect costs. Retirement developments often include 
additional services and communal facilities of a similar sort to those in cohousing communities.  
Most retirement communities are actively managed, either by the original developer, a specialist 
private firm or a housing association, and wardens are often employed.  Rather than being sold off-
plan, the schemes are generally completed and have management and facilities in place before 
residents move in.  All these things impose costs that are not typical to the mainstream housing 
market. Finally, local authority plans rarely provide explicitly for retirement housing. When 
planning applications for such specialised housing are produced by external organisations, these are 
routinely denied in the first instance and only allowed on appeal, which increases development 
time—and costs (Ball 2011). 
 
Similarly, many characteristics of cohousing projects have cost implications. Some might reduce 
unit costs compared to standard developments for older people: 
 Smaller average unit size than standard development; 
 Provision of shared facilities (that otherwise would be one per household—e.g. washing 
machines); and 
 Contribution of residents’ own labour (self-build). 
 
Others could be expected to increase cost: 
 Inclusion of a common house and shared facilities that would not be present in a standard 
development (e.g. craft workshop, large-scale kitchen and dining room, office space, storage 
areas); and 
 The increased time required for the development process (discussed below). 
 
The influence of each factor will differ according to the specifics of each group and development 
site--for example, some cohousing communities are at higher density than standard developments 
(which would reduce unit costs) while others are at lower-than-normal densities.  Garden sizes and 
leisure areas will vary depending on the site, as will the costs of providing them. Similarly, some 
cohousing developments employ materials and finishes that are of a higher standard than a 
developer’s normal offer, and each community will decide on the extent to which they wish to 
subscribe to (costly) environmental efficiency standards (e.g., photovoltaic solar panels, biomass 
heating systems, green roofs, etc.). The calculation of the cost difference between cohousing and 
other developments is straightforward for most of these cases.   
 
There is one area in which the cost difference can be both substantial and unpredictable: time.  
Cohousing developments take longer than other housing construction.  In the first place there is the 
time required to find a suitable building site by the would-be cohousing group.  While this precedes 
any actual financial investment, this energy-consuming process can take years, particularly in high-
demand areas like southern England (one London group looked for a site for thirteen years). Sites 
suitable for cohousing are also often attractive for standard housing, so aspiring co-housers can lose 
out to profit-maximising private developers with extensive financial resources. And even when the 
development process is underway, a cohousing project can be expected to take longer than a 
standard project, for three main reasons: 
 
 The group itself is involved in deciding on the features that their new community 
will have, and the group decision-making process is an iterative and time-consuming 
one; 
 The general novelty of the process can give rise to delays; the planning process may 
be longer than for a standard development, as both local-authority planning 
departments and local residents (at least in the UK) tend to be unfamiliar with the 
concept and require convincing; and 
 Where the developer and the group are distinct entities, negotiations can be time-
consuming as there are so many parties involved. 
 
The cost of this extra time can be very substantial.  They fall on the owner of the land (presumably 
the developer), who may have an empty or near-empty site for months or even years longer than 
would normally be expected.  During this time the developer must make payments on any loan 
taken out for site acquisition, but will not have received any income. Depending on the arrangement 
between developer and buyers, this cost may be transferred to the final unit prices.  
 
Given all this, it is clear that provision of new cohousing will not necessarily be cheaper than 
conventional new-build.  If both group and developer are committed then substantial cost reductions 
can be achieved—e.g. through the use of self-build.  But in high-cost areas like southern England, 
land value makes up such a high percentage of build cost that groups who pay market value for land 
will almost inevitably face high unit prices. Yet irrespective of the final cost and individual 
financial investments, cohousing residents devise and subscribe to a collective legal and financial 
arrangement that constraints their ability to make any significant profit upon re-sale. Thus, while 
they are prepared to follow regular price-setting mechanisms of the market to begin with, the model 
they institute as a group is designed to circumvent (at least partially) this process in future. 
 
Risk and uncertainty 
 
Both supply of and demand for housing will be affected by market actors’ perceptions of the risks 
involved.  The development of a cohousing community involves a number of risks and 
uncertainties, some obvious from the beginning and others not. Some are probably universal to all 
cohousing projects while others relate to specific features of individual communities.  What are 
these risks and who bears them, and how do they differ from the risks involved in development of 
standard new-build housing? 
 
Prospective cohousing residents must assume a number of risks and uncertainties that purchasers of 
new-build housing do not face.  This is largely because the co-housers are involved at a much 
earlier stage of the process than purchasers of standard housing—the group formation and design 
process has no corollary in normal for-profit development.  The risks at this stage, which do not 
have direct financial consequences, include the risk that the project will fall apart and uncertainties 
about the ultimate legal status of the community.  These are not easy to quantify in money terms but 
can nevertheless be expected to affect individuals’ behaviour and attitudes towards the project.  
 
Producing housing for sale to cohousing communities is an untried business model in the UK, and 
the developer faces both the risks inherent in any residential development (including planning risk 
and development risk), but also the risks and uncertainties involved in providing a new product for 
a new type of consumer. Table 1 summarises risks and uncertainties for developers, and Table 2 for 
cohousing groups.   
 
Table 1: Risks and uncertainties for cohousing developers taking on cohousing projects 
Stage of 
cohousing 
Risks/uncertainties 
Is risk higher or lower 
than for developer of 
Direct financial 
consequences? 
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process standard new-build 
housing? 
In the group 
formation 
and design 
process 
Risk that the project will fall 
apart 
Higher Y 
Uncertainty about completion 
date 
Higher Y 
In the 
planning 
and 
development 
process 
Planning risk Same: Depends on local 
authority 
Y 
Development risk—the risk 
of cost and time overruns 
(degree to which developer 
bears depends on negotiations 
with group) 
May be lower in 
cohousing if developer can 
pass costs on to cohousing 
group  
Y 
Risk that the group will fall 
apart 
Higher Y 
After 
completion 
Risk of empty units lower if group acts as 
100% pre-sale; 
Y 
higher if there are 
problems finding 
qualifying households 
 
Table 1: Risks and uncertainties for co-housing group members 
 
Stage of co-
housing 
process 
Risks/uncertainties 
Is risk higher or lower than for 
purchaser of standard new-build 
housing? 
Direct 
financial 
consequences? 
In the group 
formation 
and design 
process 
Lack of clarity about final 
price 
Higher N 
Risk that the project will fall 
apart 
Higher N 
Risk that member won’t 
qualify e.g. for shared 
ownership 
Higher N 
Uncertainty about ultimate 
ownership 
Higher N 
In the 
planning and 
development 
process 
Uncertainty about completion 
date 
Higher N 
Community risk—that 
individuals will disagree/pull 
out 
Higher N 
Development risk—the risk of 
cost overruns (depending on 
negotiations with developer) 
Higher Y 
After 
completion 
Community risk—that 
neighbours won’t get on 
Unclear.  Possibly lower, as residents of 
standard housing won’t know neighbours 
beforehand; but greater interaction 
Y 
Decline in value; difficulty in 
resale 
Higher Y 
Operating risk—maintenance 
and management 
Unclear.  Standard multi-unit housing 
employs maintenance staff while co-
housers do management themselves 
Y 
 
The table suggests that prospective co-housing residents must assume a number of risks and uncertainties 
that purchasers of new-build housing do not face.  This is largely because the co-housers are involved at a 
much earlier stage of the process than purchasers of standard housing—the group formation and design 
process has no corollary in normal for-profit development.  The risks at this stage—which are nonfinancial-- 
include the risk that the project will fall apart and uncertainties about the ultimate legal status of the 
community.  These are not easy to quantify in money terms but can nevertheless be expected to affect 
individuals’ behaviour and attitudes towards the project.  
 
Once the development is underway co-housers bear risks that households moving into typical new-build 
housing do not.  In a project where units are sold at cost to group members, the co-housers share 
development risk if the pricing structure allows for cost overruns to be passed through to them.  After 
completion the main financial risk is that co-housing units may be harder to sell and/or less valuable than 
analogous owner-occupied units, because of the restrictions on resale or the lack of mainstream interest 
(there are nevertheless alternative networks and routes of information for this niche market). There is also 
what we term ‘community risk’—that is, the risk of rifts or divisions within the group of residents.  This can 
also happen in standard housing, of course.  The emphasis placed by co-housers on group cohesiveness 
means that such rifts should be less likely in co-housing, but if they did occur they would be regarded as 
more serious. The short and long-term impact of divisions or disagreements can in theory be attenuated by 
the formal norms and informal mechanisms that allow for conflict negotiation.  
 
While group members face many uncertainties without direct financial consequences, particularly in 
the early stages of the project, Table 1 shows that the additional risks could all affect the developer 
in money terms.  The developer faces the risk that the group will fall apart before the project is 
finished, thus eliminating this putative market—although, as discussed, the housing association has 
allowed for this contingency by ensuring that the units would also be suitable for sale on the open 
market.  Planning risk is greater in some local authorities, as their willingness to countenance 
cohousing varies widely.  There is also the significant risk of time delays, which impose direct costs 
on the developer. As mentioned above, some of these unknown costs can also pose financial risks 
for the residents, as they can be passed on to them upon sale.  
 
Overall, because cohousing developers face higher risks than with standard development, they must 
therefore also seek higher returns.  These returns might be measured in financial terms but in the 
case of not-for-profit developers could also include intangible benefits such as the knowledge that 
they are providing good housing or are developing tools that they can use more widely.  From the 
developer’s point of view these higher risks might also be seen as an inevitable part of 
entrepreneurial product innovation.  The residents, however, are unlikely to repeat this process, so 
the question is how risks to them can be mitigated and how ‘best practices’ could be appropriately 
learnt and exchanged.  
 
Empirical findings 
 
The Featherstone project is unusual in that the group is being formed around an identified site, 
whereas in most cohousing communities in the UK and abroad the group came together first and 
then found a site.  The case-study site is Featherstone Lodge, an imposing 18-bedroom Victorian 
house built in 1858 for a London businessman.  It sits on a ridge in leafy Forest Hill and boasts a 
remarkable 1.5-acre walled garden—one of the few remaining in the area.  It passed into 
institutional use in the early 20
th
 century and in the 1960s became a drug-treatment centre for heroin 
addicts.   
 
Figure 1 AROUND HERE: London borough map 
Subscript: Featherstone Lodge is located in the South London borough of Lewisham 
Source: Authors. 
 
IMAGES 2 AND 3 AROUND HERE: Featherstone Lodge 
Subscript Figure 2: Rear view, from garden, of Featherstone Lodge 
Source Figure 2: Claire Anderson, Hanover Housing Association 
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Subscript Figure 3: Front view of Featherstone Lodge 
Source Figure 3: Melissa Fernández Arrigoitia 
 
When this institution closed the house was put up for sale, and despite its attractive location, it 
failed to find a buyer.  Two neighbourhood residents approached a housing association, one of the 
UK’s largest providers of housing for older people, to suggest that they buy it with a view to turning 
it into a cohousing community.  The association agreed and purchased the property in 2011.  In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis London property prices had plunged, and the plot was 
secured for £1.4 million-- a bargain for the Housing Association, and an impossibility for the 
individual would-be co-housers.  The developer in our case study is not only one of the largest 
providers of retirement and extra-care housing in the UK but also a major institutional promoter of 
the senior cohousing model. The association is motivated by the idea that it can become a pioneer in 
the field of senior cohousing, a type of intangible benefit that nevertheless has real value.  
According to a senior officer of the association, the association believes in ‘an anti-paternalistic 
provision of older people’s cohousing that encourages active and preventive ageing’ (Interview, 
January 2012). The association is also working with three other London cohousing groups. These 
collaborations require a great deal of input from the housing association in terms of liaison with the 
group and the local planning authority, but it hopes to learn lessons from these pioneering schemes 
that can be translated into a more general cohousing template.  
 
In September that year the founders began recruiting other group members.  Since then members 
have met monthly, working with architects and the housing association to design the new scheme, 
as well as with each other to develop their identity as a group.  Their planning application was 
formally submitted in Summer 2014 and is expected to be approved by the local authority in late 
2014. Meanwhile, except for a live-in caretaker (who is also a group member), the house has 
remained empty. 
 
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE: Cohousing group and architects considering design options 
Source: Melissa Fernández Arrigoitia (October 2012) 
  
 
Although the group’s membership has changed over the three years of its existence, its overall 
composition has remained fairly stable. There were 15 people at the first group meeting, eleven 
women and four men; a further five women and one man sent apologies.  There was only one 
couple.  The majority were white, and lived in London but not in the immediate local area; most 
were in their mid-50s to mid-60s.  Over the course of three years many members have dropped out 
and others have replaced them but this pattern – in which about 2/3 of group members are single 
women from London - has persisted.  Many but not all of the members plan to sell their current 
homes in order to fund their purchase of the cohousing units.  Others will enter into shared-
ownership arrangements with the developer.  Out of 33 total there will be seven social rented units 
(. 
 
Of the 22 names on the minutes of that first meeting, only six were still actively involved three 
years later; attendance at group meetings was averaging 8-12 persons in mid-2014.  Anecdotally, 
this high attrition rate is not atypical, and is not necessarily an indicator of failure; it may in fact be 
a positive indicator, as those most likely to enjoy and benefit from the scheme remained and others 
self-selected out.   
 
The final plans for the Featherstone project comprise 33 relatively small one- and two-bedroom 
flats (some in the existing house, and some built in the garden), plus a common house with large 
kitchen and dining area in the main lodge building
5
.  The units were kept small for two reasons: 
because group members preferred a relatively egalitarian distribution of space, and to keep costs 
down.    But other factors worked to push costs up.  The main one was time: it took much longer to 
agree a design and to secure planning permission than expected.  During the first two years, the 
design changed frequently.  The composition of the group was very fluid: some participants 
dropped out and were replaced by new people, who wanted to re-open design questions that had 
been regarded as settled.  And although the local authority political leaders and housing department 
were enthusiastic supporters of the project, the planners were less convinced.  While not specifically 
opposed to the idea of cohousing, they required numerous revisions and clarifications on issues 
such as the amount of parking, the relationship of the proposed new buildings to various protected 
trees, the layout of the garden and the distance from the new buildings to neighbouring houses.  All 
these revisions took time.  The original timetable for the project had envisioned a move-in date of 
Spring 2013 (18 months after the group’s first meeting).  This proved to be wildly over-optimistic; 
it is now clear that from start to finish the project will take at least 4 ½ years and probably more. 
 
The housing association became involved in this project because it fits with its charitable mission, 
and because it sees cohousing as a way to improve the services it offers to its other residents.  
However Featherstone is not social housing but rather a private development
6
, and the association, 
as developer, needs to cover its costs.  The association therefore required that the units be designed 
in such a way that they would be saleable on the open market if the cohousing group were to 
dissolve or not to occupy all the units.  This stipulation was not clear to the group until midway 
through the design process, and this—along with other disagreements about costs—made it clear to 
group members that their interests and those of the developer were not necessarily congruent. 
 
In early discussions, the association told group members that they could buy the finished units at 
cost on completion.  This price was expected to be about 10% below the market value for a similar 
units; the discount was presented as a way of compensating group members for their contribution to 
the design of the scheme.  Final costs will not be known until the scheme receives planning 
permission and builders’ quotes are secured, but it is clear that costs will be significantly higher 
than originally anticipated.   House prices have risen sharply in London in the last five years, but 
construction costs have gone up just as much or more—so the goal of a 10% discount on market 
values may be difficult to achieve.  The most recent estimates give prices for group members of 
between £270,000 and £356,000 per unit.  This was close to the average price of a London house in 
August 2014 at £330,000, and well above the average £181,757 for UK houses as a whole.  How 
much the lengthy delays have added to financial costs—and who will pay for them—is not yet 
known.   
 
Because of the nature of the cohousing development process, members so far have joined the group 
before they knew what the unit price would be (there were estimated figures, but these have 
changed regularly)—and therefore before they knew for certain whether they would be able to 
afford it.  Initial members were effectively expressing interest in the scheme before making a 
financial commitment, and implicitly expected that through the cohousing process they would be 
able to design a project that would meet their needs in terms of specification, appearance, ethos and, 
crucially, price.   
 
But it was difficult for group members to affect price, for two main reasons.  The first was that the 
group rarely discussed financial specifics. They spent much time at meetings working with the 
architects on design issues but the question of what each member could afford to pay was only 
broached after some months of meetings, and most members provided the information in writing 
rather than sharing it with the whole group—perhaps because of cultural taboos about discussing 
                                                 
5
 See Fernandez and Scanlon (forthcoming) for a description of the design process. 
6
 At least 10 of the 33 units will be affordable, including both social rental and shared ownership. 
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finances with relative strangers.   Thus it was only after several months of discussions with the 
architects that the group provided target unit costs based on how much they could afford to pay. 
 
The second reason was that the developer was slow to cost the scheme, even after the architects’ 
designs were well advanced. This occasioned a great deal of frustration among group members, 
who felt they were ‘flying blind’ in trying to work towards a cost-effective solution without any 
information about costs.  One of the fundamental questions was the distribution of units of different 
sizes (one-bed vs two-beds; townhouses vs flats).  Members felt they couldn’t decide what size unit 
they wanted without knowing the costs, but costs couldn’t be accurately worked out without a 
notional distribution of units.  The first set of cost estimates, produced in November 2012, were 
well above what most group members felt they could afford, and the architects worked with the 
group to identify design elements that could be changed to cut costs.  
 
In our case study, while the interests of the cohousing developer and residents have not been 
entirely congruent, they need each other: without the housing association the group would not have 
a site, and without the group the housing association would not have a cohousing community.  The 
housing association is acting as developer and has assumed all financial risk for the project, as 
would be normal for a speculative market development or a typical social rented development.  But 
this project is not speculative; the cohousing group is the putative collective client. However three 
years after the process began there was still no formal relationship between the developer and the 
group: there was no written contract between the two parties and members of the cohousing group 
had no financial stake in the project. The housing association therefore bore all financial risk during 
the prolonged first phase of the project, while the group invested all social energies and costs. 
 
The plan is that at some point, members would pay a deposit of approximately 10% of the eventual 
cost of their dwelling.  However neither the amount of this deposit, nor the date when it will be 
required, had yet been determined as of this writing.  The amount of the deposit depends on the 
final cost figures, which cannot be produced until planning permission is secured and contractors 
produce quotes.  Cost may also affect the ultimate membership of the group, as some participants 
have said they would simply have to leave the project if the prices were higher than they could 
afford.  Indeed, some early members did leave once the first indicative prices were circulated.  
 
Although the exact figure is not yet known, the initial deposit will probably be in the at least 
£25,000 per household.  Several group members are intending to finance their purchase at 
Featherstone by selling their current houses.  Recognising that some participants may not have 
enough liquid assets to cover the deposit, the housing association has offered to fund this through a 
loan, to be repaid on sale of participants’ homes.   
 
The group’s experience with trying to impose a membership fee suggests that the down payment 
may prove a significant hurdle, as much psychological as financial.  Throughout the group 
development process, members have proved reluctant to part with even a relatively small 
membership fee (around £75). The exact amount of the fee was discussed at almost every meeting 
during the first year, and participants only began to pay in June 2013, some 18 months into the 
process. This may reveal their perception of the risks involved. It suggests that, before they part 
with deposits that may represent their life’s savings, they will require real certainty about outcomes. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the UK system, the development of a new cohousing community necessarily involves the 
acquisition of land, and prospective cohousing developers have to compete in the traditional land 
market. In London, this value is very high indeed, and growing. Most land that is suitable for 
cohousing development is also suitable for other types of residential use, including speculative 
development for owner-occupation.  The profits on the latter will almost always enable speculative 
developers to outbid cohousing groups in free-market land sales, especially in areas of high housing 
costs such as London and southern England.  This is one reason that so many UK cohousing groups 
must search for years for a suitable and affordable plot.   
 
This problem is not confined to cohousing—it is increasingly recognised that many specialist types 
of residential development are difficult to get off the ground because they are unable to match the 
prices paid for land by those developing for owner-occupation.  This includes dedicated private 
rented housing (Scanlon et al 2013) and standard retirement housing (Ball 2011).  One way around 
this is for the public sector (often local authorities) to use directed measures that have the effect of 
reducing the land price to enable these developments to be built.  Public bodies, including local 
authorities, are sometimes willing to sell plots at market value but defer receipt of part of the 
payment, which makes the finances affordable for the developer.  This mechanism was used in the 
case of LILAC, the Leeds cohousing development completed in 2013, where ‘After 
protracted discussions, the local authority sold the site to Lilac at market levels, deferring receipt of 
half the land value’ (Chatterton 2013, p. 1658).  
 
Unusually, in the case study described in this paper the acquisition of land was not a problem: a 
suitable plot was in hand from the beginning, and the price paid was exceptionally low.  Even so, 
the costs of design, planning and construction--and in particular the time required—mean that if 
Featherstone’s developer is to cover its costs (which it must), the units will not sell for much less 
than market value.  Given (increasing) London house prices this will make them unaffordable for 
many.  Those group members who own homes in London will have seen the value of their assets 
rise as well, but those who rent, who live outside London,  may find it difficult or impossible to pay 
the final prices. Interestingly, those who do eventually pay market or near-market prices will be 
engaging with price-setting mechanisms that, as a group, they seek to challenge or limit. That is, 
while they will buy their cohousing unit by selling (and making a large profit) in the speculative 
housing market, they will actively constrain themselves and future group members from recreating 
the same profit-maximising system upon re-sale. This irony is partly a function of their age—most 
belong to a generation that has seen very high returns on houses purchased decades ago —and 
partly a function of the lack of alternative housing options (both financial and social) in London, 
which meant that they were forced to operate in the traditional market.  
 
The slowness of establishing cohousing communities in the UK reflects the risks of this nascent 
tenure to developers.  The financial services sector and property developers employ models for 
quantifying and pricing risk and returns, which in principle could also be applied to at least some of 
the risks inherent in the development of cohousing communities.  In practice however the data are 
too limited to permit this.  It is clear, though, that both developers and cohousers face a number of 
risks and uncertainties that buyers and developers of standard housing do not.  Implicitly we must 
assume that for those who continue to be involved, the expected returns outweigh the risks.  This 
implies that at the moment, only those who value the returns very highly (i.e. those who are strongly 
ideologically committed) will choose to become involved with and continue to be committed to 
cohousing—and this applies to both residents and developers.   
 
The tenor of discussions about housing and community is now shifting: there is a recognition that 
communities need thoughtful nurturing, and an increased interest from both policy-makers and 
individuals in alternative housing solutions.  The early pioneers will have to bear more risk, but the 
perceived risks will fall if the tenure becomes more widespread and institutions like local authorities 
and mortgage lenders become accustomed to dealing with it.  But risks will not fall and the tenure 
won’t become more widely known until and unless the issue of development cost is addressed.  
Developer-led cohousing doesn’t necessarily produce an affordable product, but self-financing 
projects of this size is out of reach of many groups—and probably impracticable for site-first 
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projects.  LILAC for example benefited from a large government subsidy.  Without targeted 
assistance in the form of low-cost land or specific subsidies, groups will find it hard to compete 
with developers of other types of housing.  Housing associations may be the most suitable 
development partners but given the regulatory framework and governance structures, it cannot be 
assumed that their interests and those of cohousing groups are entirely aligned. 
 
Economics, finance and planning are by no means the only barriers to the creation and progress of 
cohousing groups (see Jarvis in this issue). Nevertheless, they are crucial elements in the early 
development of the group, as they determine who gets included and excluded from the equation, 
and in what ways. Land value, location and price as well as the risks and uncertainties involved for 
both the developers and residents all affect the way the process plays out, and impact on the shifting 
relationships between the key interested parties. It is therefore our hope that with the increasing 
popularity of cohousing in the UK and London, this first detailed foray into the economic aspects of 
its development will lead to further analysis of comparative forms.  
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